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a b s t r a c t
Under a continuity hypothesis on bi-preferences defined on a topologically-connected choice-set, as
formalized by Giarlotta–Greco (2013), this letter reports that a mildly consistent, double-minded
decision-maker is single-minded in the sense of being fully consistent and decisive. The results
generalize recent work of Giarlotta–Watson (2019), and thereby provide a far-reaching generalization
of a result of Schmeidler (1971) that has received considerable recent attention, and extend to
mixture-sets of Herstein–Milnor (1953). They give another perspective on the authors’ work on the
Eilenberg–Sonnenschein (ES) research program embracing both the topological and algebraic registers
in choice theory.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction1
In a pioneering paper that draws on a rich literature in math-2
ematical psychology, Giarlotta and Greco (2013) proposed the3
analysis of what can be seen as a double-minded decision-maker4
by introducing what they refer to as an NaP-preference structure.5
After referring to the classical theory based on a binary relation6
that is ‘‘simultaneously transitive and complete’’, Giarlotta and7
Watson (2017) write:8
✩ The authors should like to acknowledge the inspiration received from a
serendipitous meeting with Professor Alfio Giarlotta on July 1 at the 19th SAET
Meetings in Ischia (Italy), and also a presentation of Professor Claudio Meo at the
same conference. In addition to them, the authors are grateful to Max Amarante,
Yorgos Gerasimou, Ani Ghosh, Debraj Ray and Eddie Schlee for stimulating
conversation and correspondence. These results were finalized, and reported by
the second author, at Positivity X, a conference held at the University of Pretoria
July 8–12, 2019. He should like to thank the organizers for their hospitality.
Needless to say, all errors of reading and interpretation are solely the authors’.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: m.uyanik@uq.edu.au (M. Uyanık), akhan@jhu.edu
(M.A. Khan).
1 We use the certified random order in order to list the authors; see
Ray-Robson (2018, American Economic Review).
This [classical] approach to preference modeling has many 9
advantages, [but also] some serious drawbacks, since the two 10
main assumptions of transitivity and completeness are hardly 11
satisfied in most real-world applications. A NaP-preference 12
(necessary and possible preference) is a pair of nested reflexive 13
relations on a set such that the smaller is transitive, the larger 14
is complete, and the two components jointly satisfy natural 15
forms of mixed completeness and transitive coherence.2 16
Giarlotta and Watson (2019) refer to the two preferences as rigid 17
and soft, and see the latter as a transitively coherent enlargement 18
of the other.3 Leaving aside linguistic dichotomies such as soft– 19
hard, flexible-rigid, hesitant-firm, the point is that they consider 20
2 The authors introduce the concept of a normalized NaP-preferences, one
whose smaller component is a partial order, and show that they are well-graded
in the sense of Doignon and Falmagne (1997) on a finite set. A genesis of the
concept can be traced to Giarlotta (2014), also see Giarlotta (2019).
3 All references to Giarlotta and Watson (2019) in this paper are to the
preliminary draft circulated under the title ‘‘The interplay between two rational-
ity tenets: extending Schmeidler’s theorem to bi-preferences’’. The authors are
grateful to Alfio Giarlotta for his unhesitating generosity in sharing this draft
with us.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108657
0165-1765/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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a decision-maker who can be single-minded on some choices and1
double-minded regarding others. She is not uniformly decisive2
or uniformly hesitant, never always assured and never always3
skeptical.4
While the authors are fully cognizant of the recent literature5
in decision theory, they do not draw on the long tradition in the6
economics of social cost–benefit analysis and project appraisal7
that takes intergenerational equity into account, and that also8
has a bi-preferential thrust. Marglin (1963) sights Gerhard Colm9
for giving importance to the frame of reference in determining10
preference relations, connects his position to Rousseau’s views11
on the distinction between the individual and general will, and12
articulates a ‘‘schizophrenic’’ viewpoint in opposition to what he13
calls the ‘‘authoritarian’’ and the ‘‘interdependent’’ viewpoints. He14
writes:15
Do not be put off by the label ‘‘schizophrenia’’. I believe it a16
reasonably accurate label, [but] am, however, prevented from17
committing myself to it fully because of a dilemma inherent18
in schizophrenia: given two preference maps existing side19
by side, how can we choose one as representing the ‘‘true’’,20
or if you will, the ‘‘higher’’ preferences of the individual?21
Consequently, what significance can be attached to such con-22
cepts as Pareto optimality? That is, if a particular allocation23
of resources is Pareto-optimal in terms of one set of prefer-24
ence maps but nonoptimal in terms of the other, what does25
‘‘optimal’’ mean?26
To be sure, welfare economics is not our primary concern here,27
but what is missing in this literature, and what the modern bi-28
preference literature supplies, is some sort of integration of the29
two preference maps.430
In a broad ranging discussion of the literature antecedent31
to their work, Giarlotta and Greco (2013) had already drawn32
attention to the relevance of two directions of the decision the-33
ory literature: Aumann’s (1962) relaxation of the completeness34
postulate on ≿, and Luce’s (1956) relaxation5 of the transitivity35
postulate on ∼, confining ourselves only to the pioneers.6 They36
‘‘combine these alternative approaches to preference modeling37
into one’’, and note that bi-preferences are ‘‘designed in a way38
that transitivity and completeness hold jointly but not singu-39
larly’’. In particular, they detail how bi-preferences can arise40
from Bewley’s Knightian preferences and Lehrer–Tepper’s justi-41
fiable preferences. They also arise from the transitive core of a42
uni-preference as in Nishimura (2018).743
However, even leaving all questions of substance and/or de-44
scriptive realism aside, the results of this letter can be introduced45
purely in the technical register: as a simultaneous generaliza-46
tion of several results in the uni-preference literature that has47
4 Also see the subsequent follow-up of Marglin’s work by Sen (1967), Ander-
son (1995) and their references; we are indebted to Hülya Eraslan. Moving to
two other streams, Klaus and Meo (2019) use a bi-preference structure, selfish
and altruistic preferences, in their recent investigation of housing markets, and
one can discern such a structure also in Armstrong (1939), Chipman (1971)
and Gorman (1971). A potentially fruitful connection to this literature in future
work may represent a secondary contribution of the work reported here.
5 This relaxation gave rise to an extensive literature on semiorders, a term
due to Luce (1956); also see Wiener (1914) pioneering paper and the extended
treatments of Fishburn and Monjardet (1992) and Luce (2000) for a more
detailed references to this literature.
6 Some writers may also want to include (Krantz, 1967); see also Krantz et al.
(1971) for a comprehensive treatment.
7 Nishimura and Ok (2018) take uni-preferences as primitive and define the
transitive core as the largest weakly consistent relation contained in it; also see
Giarlotta and Greco (2013), Giarlotta and Watson (2019) and Giarlotta (2019) for
references to the work of Ghirardato, Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, Siniscalchi
and others. The latter has a bibliography of 66 items.
been brought into prominence as a consequence of Schmeidler’s 48
striking 1971 result: there he deduced decisiveness for a decision- 49
maker from his or her consistency of preferences provided that 50
they were continuous in a connected topology. This was a sharp 51
deduction of a behavioral consequence from a merely technical 52
requirement. It was dramatic enough that the author did not see 53
any need for a framing in terms of an antecedent literature going 54
back to Eilenberg (1941). 55
Eilenberg inaugurated the study of ordered topological spaces 56
by considering an anti-symmetric relation on a choice-set en- 57
dowed with a topological structure. His results were respectively 58
extended and elaborated by Sonnenschein (1965, 1967) and Sen 59
(1967, 1969) to apply to contexts especially relevant to the theory 60
of economic choice where a choice space of uncountable cardi- 61
nality was partitioned into indifference classes.8 Sonnenschein 62
deduced full consistency for a decisive decision-maker from a 63
rather mild consistency assumption on his or her preferences if 64
they were continuous in a connected topology. As such he has 65
a result that is a dual precursor to that of Schmeidler’s. Son- 66
nenschein’s work was quickly followed by Sen’s deconstruction 67
of the consistency postulate, and one that eliminated topological 68
considerations entirely from the subject. In recent work, Khan and 69
Uyanık (2019), Galaabaatar et al. (2019) and Uyanık and Khan 70
(2019) have given a systematic and synthetic exposition of this 71
literature concerning a single-minded decision-maker: a single 72
preference on a single choice-set. 73
It is in their most recent work that Giarlotta–Watson con- 74
nect the bi-preference literature to Schmeidler’s result, and in 75
Sections 2 and 3, we present a substantial generalization that 76
considerably relaxes their transitivity assumptions, and obtains 77
full transitivity of their soft relation along with its complete- 78
ness.9 Furthermore, our results connect their work not only to 79
that of Schmeidler but also to the classic work of Eilenberg– 80
Sonnenschein and Herstein–Milnor. In Section 4 we present pos- 81
sible implications of our results for further work. Section 5 is 82
devoted to the proofs, the bi-preference results also allow a 83
sharpening of the earlier results on the uni-preferences. As such, 84
it has both substantive and technical content. 85
2. Notational and conceptual preliminaries 86
Let X be a set. A subset ≿ of X×X denote a binary relation on X . 87
We denote an element (x, y) ∈ ≿ as x ≿ y. The asymmetric part ≻ 88
of ≿ is defined as x ≻ y if x ≿ y and y ̸≿ x, and its symmetric part 89
∼ is defined as x ∼ y if x ≿ y and y ≿ x. We call x ▷◁ y if x ̸≿ y and 90
y ̸≿ x. The inverse of ≿ is defined as x ≾ y if y ≿ x. Its asymmetric 91
part ≺ is defined analogously and its symmetric part is ∼. We 92
provide the descriptive adjectives pertaining to a relation in a 93
tabular form for the reader’s convenience in Table 1.10 94
Definition 1. A weak bi-preference on a set X is a pair (≿R,≿S) 95
of binary relations on X such that for all x, y, z ∈ X , 96
(i) x ≿R y implies x ≿S y, 97
(ii) ≿R is hemi-transitive, 98
(iii) x ∼i z ≿j y, or x ≿i z ∼j y imply x ≿S y, where i, j ∈ {R, S} 99
and i ̸= j. 100
8 Eilenberg also tackled the problem of the representation of an anti-
symmetric preference relation by a continuous function on a choice set,
presumably independently taken up by Wold (1943–1944), and extended to the
economic setting by Debreu (1954) and a rich stream of subsequent work. This
issue of representation is not our concern here, and we hope to take it up
in Uyanık and Khan (2019).
9 See Giarlotta and Watson (2019), and also Footnote 3 above concerning it
and the earlier draft.
10 We draw the reader’s attention to our label hemi-transitive: it originates
in Rader (1963) and Sonnenschein (1965).
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Table 1
Properties of binary relations.
Reflexive x ≿ x ∀x ∈ X
Complete x ≿ y or y ≿ x ∀x, y ∈ X
Transitive x ≿ y ≿ z ⇒ x ≿ z ∀x, y, z ∈ X
Quasi-transitive x ≻ y ≻ z ⇒ x ≻ z ∀x, y, z ∈ X
Negatively transitive x ̸≿ y ̸≿ z ⇒ x ̸≿ z ∀x, y, z ∈ X
Hemi-transitive x ≻ y ∼ z ⇒ x ≻ z and x ∼ y ≻ z ⇒ x ≻ z ∀x, y, z ∈ X
Definition 2. A weak bi-preference (≿R,≿S) on a set X is strongly1
comonotonic if for all x, y, z ∈ X ,2
(i) x ≻S y implies x ≻R y,3
(ii) x ≻R y and x ≻S z ∼S y imply x ≻S y,4
(iii) x ≻R y and x ∼S z ≻S y imply x ≻S y.5
Strong comonotonicity strengthens the transitive coherence of6
the bi-preference and provides a two-way relationship between7
the asymmetric parts of the rigid, ≿R, and soft, ≿S , preferences.8
Definition 3. A weak bi-preference (≿R,≿S) on X is non-trivial if9
x ≻S y for some x, y ∈ X .10
Let ≿ be a binary relation on a set X . For any x ∈ X , let11
A≿(x) = {y ∈ X |y ≿ x} denote the upper section of ≿ at x and12
A≾(x) = {y ∈ X |y ≾ x} its lower section at x. A relation ≿ on13
a topological space X has closed (open) sections if it has closed14
(open) upper and lower sections. Moreover, ≿ is continuous if it15
has closed sections and its asymmetric part ≻ has open sections.16
Definition 4. A weak bi-preference (≿R,≿S) on a topological17
space is bi-continuous if ≿R has closed sections and ≻S has open18
sections.19
A set S is said to be a mixture set if for any x, y ∈ S and for20
any µ we can associate another element,11 which we write as21
xµy, which is again in S , and where for all x, y ∈ S and all λ,µ,22
(S1) x1y = x, (S2) xµy = y(1− µ)x, (S3) (xµy)λy = x(λµ)y.23
Definition 5. A weak bi-preference (≿R,≿S) on a mixture set S24
is scalarly bi-continuous if for all x, y, z ∈ S ,25
(i) {λ | xλy ≿R z} and {λ | xλy ≾R z} are closed,26
(ii) {λ | xλy ≻S z} and {λ | xλy ≺S z} are open.27
Part (i) is equivalent to mixture-continuity of ≿R, and its part28
(ii) is a property slightly stronger than ≿S being Archimedean1229
which requires that for all x, y, z ∈ S with x ≻S y, there exist30
λ, δ ∈ (0, 1) such that xλz ≻S y and x ≻S yδz.31
3. The results32
This section presents two results on completeness and tran-33
sitivity of weak bi-preferences. The first result shows that un-34
der a continuity hypothesis, a decision-maker with a non-trivial,35
strongly comonotonic and mildly consistent weak bi-preference36
defined on a topologically-connected choice-set, is decisive and37
consistent.38
Theorem 1. Let (≿R,≿S) be a non-trivial, bi-continuous and39
strongly comonotonic weak bi-preference on a connected topological40
space. Then ≿S is complete, transitive and continuous.41
11 In deference to Herstein and Milnor (1953), lower case Greek letters
consistently denote real numbers in [0,1].
12 The Archimedean property and part (ii) of Definition 5 are equivalent if ≿S
is mixture-continuous; see Galaabaatar et al. (2019, Proposition 1) for details.
Theorem 1 generalizes the main result of Giarlotta and Watson 42
(2019) by showing that a weak consistency assumption on (≿R 43
,≿S) is sufficient to obtain both completeness and transitivity of 44
≿S . It is in this sense that the double minded-decision maker 45
is single-minded. A weak bi-preference is a bi-preference if (ii) 46
and (iii) in Definition 1 are replaced with their stronger versions 47
(ii′) ≿R is reflexive and transitive, and (iii′) x ≿R z ≿S y, or 48
x ≿S z ≿R y imply x ≿S y. The reader should note that our 49
notion of weak bi-preference drops the reflexivity and weakens 50
the joint transitivity of the bi-preferences assumed in Giarlotta 51
and Watson (2019). Theorem 1 also generalizes Khan and Uyanık 52
(2019, Proposition 1) result on uni-preferences to bi-preferences 53
for connected spaces. 54
The second result suitably extends Theorem 1 to mixture sets. 55
Theorem 2. Let (≿R,≿S) be a non-trivial, scalarly bi-continuous and 56
strongly comonotonic weak bi-preference on a mixture set. Then ≿S 57
is complete, transitive, mixture-continuous and Archimedean. 58
Theorem 2 provides a two-fold generalization of Galaabaatar et al. 59
(2019, Theorem 1): it replaces uni-preferences by bi- 60
preferences, and drops the reflexivity assumption. It general- 61
izes Dubra (2011), Karni and Safra (2015) and McCarthy and 62
Mikkola (2018), and it provides a simple alternative proof of 63
the portmanteau of all these results.13 Note that the scalar bi- 64
continuity assumption is weaker than bi-continuity property of a 65
weak bi-relation defined on a convex subset of a topological vec- 66
tor space; see Uyanık and Khan (2019). Hence, Theorem 2 obtains 67
completeness and transitivity of ≿S under a weaker continuity 68
assumption. 69
4. Concluding remarks 70
In this section we see possible implications of our two theo- 71
rems for future work. The first priority is to study the two-way 72
relationship, as emphasized in Khan and Uyanık (2019), between 73
the topological structure of the choice space and the assumptions 74
on weak bi-preferences. Second, we can ask what additional 75
mathematical structures such as convexity (independence, be- 76
tweenness, additivity or convex upper sections) and monotonicity 77
would yield. Third, it is also interesting to see if the analysis 78
of Sen’s deconstruction of the transitivity postulate, as detailed 79
in Khan and Uyanık (2019), and in particular Giarlotta’s (2014) 80
examination of the sequences of mixed preferences, applies to 81
weak bi-preferences. Fourth, given that the Archimedean axiom 82
is weaker than part (ii) of the scalar bi-continuity property, it is 83
not known to us if the latter property can be replaced by the 84
former in Theorem 2. Fifth, can the relaxation of the continuity 85
postulate in Gerasimou (2013) and Uyanık and Khan (2019) yield 86
anything of interest? Finally, it is surely worth examining the 87
implications of our results for semiorders and interval orders, 88
and more generally for directions in choice theory that have 89
been recently investigated by Gerasimou (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio 90
et al. (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio and Ok (2018) and Nishimura and 91
Ok (2018). 92
5. Proofs of the results 93
First, we present a result due to Sen (1969, Theorem I) and 94
Khan and Uyanık (2019, Proposition 2) on the deconstruction of 95
the transitivity postulate.14 96
13 See Footnote 15 in Section 5 for details of this simplification that was
entirely missed in Galaabaatar et al. (2019).
14 Part (a) of Lemma 1 is observed and proved by Sonnenschein (1965,
Theorem 3). Sen’s re-statement highlights the topology-free nature of this result.
See Section 3.4 of Khan and Uyanık (2019) for extensions and discussion.
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Lemma 1. The following are true for any binary relation ≿ on a set1
X.2
(a) If ≿ is complete and hemi-transitive, then ∼ is transitive,3
(b) If ≻ is negatively transitive, then ≿ is hemi-transitive and4
quasi-transitive,5
(c) ≿ is transitive if and only if it is hemi-transitive, quasi-6
transitive, and ∼ is transitive.7
We next turn to the proof of Theorem 1.8
Proof of Theorem 1. First, consider the following claim.9
Claim 1. (a) ≻S is negatively transitive, and (b) ≿S is complete.10
It follows from negative transitivity of≻S and (b) of Lemma 1 that11
≿S is quasi-transitive and hemi-transitive. Completeness of ≿S ,12
and (a) and (c) of Lemma 1 imply that ≿S is transitive. It follows13
from ≿S is complete and ≻S has open sections that ≿S has closed14
sections. Therefore ≿S is continuous. It remains to prove Claim 115
in order to complete the proof.16
Proof of Claim 1. (a) Note that ≻S is negatively transitive if and17
only if x ≻S y implies x ≻S z or z ≻S y for all x, y, z ∈ S. Pick18
x, y ∈ X such that x ≻S y. It follows from strong comonotonicity19
that x ≻R y. We first show that20
A≺S (x) ∪ A≻S (y) = A≾R (x) ∪ A≿R (y). (1)21
The forward inclusion immediately follows from strong22
comonotonicity. In order to prove the backward inclusion, pick23
z ∈ X such that x ≿R z or z ≿R y. Let x ≿R z. Then, either x ∼R z24
or x ≻R z. Assume x ∼R z. Then x ≻R y and hemi-transitivity25
of ≿R imply that z ≻R y. It follows from the definition of weak26
bi-preference and z ∼R x that z ∼S x. Then z ≻R y, z ∼S x ≻S y27
and strong comonotonicity imply that z ≻S y. Hence, z ∈ A≻S (y).28
Now assume x ≻R z. Then the definition of weak bi-preference29
implies that either x ≻S z or x ∼S z. If x ≻S z, then z ∈ A≺S (x).30
Then let x ∼S z. Then z ∼S x ≻R y implies that z ≿S y. Hence31
either z ≻S y or z ∼S y. If z ∼S y, then x ≻S y ∼S z, x ≻R z and32
strong comonotonicity imply that x ≻S z. This contradicts x ∼S z.33
Hence, z ≻S y must hold. Therefore, z ∈ A≻S (y). The proof for34
z ≿R y is analogous.35
Note that x ≻S y implies that A≺S (x) ∪ A≻S (y) ̸= ∅. Then it36
follows from bi-continuity of the weak bi-preference, Eq. (1) and37
the connectedness of X that X = A≺S (x) ∪ A≻S (y). Hence, x ≻S y38
implies that for all z ∈ X , x ≻S z or z ≻S y. Therefore, ≻S is39
negatively transitive.40
(b) Assume there exists x, y ∈ X such that x ▷◁S y. We first show41
that42
A≻S (x) ∩ A≻S (y) = A≿R (x) ∩ A≿R (y). (2)43
The forward inclusion immediately follows from strong mono-44
tonicity. In order to prove the backward inclusion, pick z ≿R x45
and z ≿R y. Then the definition of weak bi-preference implies46
that z ≿S x and z ≿S y. If x ∼S z, it follows from z ≻R y or47
z ∼R y, and the definition of weak bi-preference that x ≿S y.48
This furnishes us a contradiction with x ▷◁S y. Hence z ≻S x. An49
analogous argument implies z ≻S y. Therefore z ∈ A≻S (x)∩A≻S (y).50
It follows from the non-triviality assumption that there exist51
x¯, y¯ ∈ X such that x¯ ≻S y¯. Part (a) implies that ≻S is negatively52
transitive, therefore x¯ ≻S x or x ≻S y¯. Assume x¯ ≻S x. Then53
negative transitivity of ≻S implies that y ≻S x or x¯ ≻S y. Since54
x ▷◁S y, therefore x¯ ≻S y. Hence x¯ ∈ A≻S (x) ∩ A≻S (y). Note that55
the set A≻S (x) ∩ A≻S (y) does not contain x. Since ≻S has open56
sections and ≿R has closed sections, therefore Eq. (2) implies that57
A≻S (x)∩A≻S (y) is both open and closed. This contradicts the con-58
nectedness of X . Analogously, x ≻S y¯ furnishes us a contradiction59
with the connectedness of X . Therefore, ≿S is complete. □ □60
The following notation is useful in the rest of this section. For 61
any binary relation ≿ on a mixture set S and any x, y, z ∈ S , let 62
I≿(x, y, z) = {λ | xλy ≿ z} and I≾(x, y, z) = {λ | z ≿ xλy}. 63
The sets I≻(x, y, z) and I≺(x, y, z) are analogously defined. 64
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2. The construction of 65
the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, but there are subtle 66
differences because of the lack of a topological structure on the 67
choice set. Moreover, for the special case of uni-preferences, the 68
proof we present here is distinct from, and considerably simpler 69
than, the proof of Theorem 1 of Galaabaatar et al. (2019).15 70
Their proof hinges crucially on the reflexivity assumption. Our 71
new method-of-proof uses a construction similar to the proof of 72
Theorem 1 and allows us to drop the reflexivity of ≿R. 73
Proof of Theorem 2. First consider the following claim. 74
Claim 2. (a) ≻S is negatively transitive, and (b) ≿S is complete. 75
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, Claim 2 and Lemma 1 76
imply that ≿S is transitive. Since ≿S is complete, and the sets 77
I≻S (x, y, z) and I≺S (x, y, z) are open for all x, y, z ∈ S , therefore 78
the sets I≿S (x, y, z) and I≾S (x, y, z) are closed. Hence ≿S is mixture- 79
continuous. Then Proposition 1 of Galaabaatar et al. (2019) im- 80
plies that ≿S is Archimedean. It remains to prove Claim 2 in order 81
to complete the proof. 82
Proof of Claim 2. (a) Pick x, y ∈ S such that x ≻S y, and pick 83
z ∈ X . It follows from strong comonotonicity that x ≻R y. We 84
next show that 85
I≻S (y, z, y) ∪ I≺S (y, z, x) = I≿R (y, z, y) ∪ I≾R (y, z, x). 86
The forward inclusion immediately follows from the strong 87
comonotonicity. In order to prove the backward inclusion, pick 88
λ ∈ I≿R (y, z, y) ∪ I≾R (y, z, x). Then yλz ≿R y or x ≿R yλz. 89
Let x ≿R yλz. Then, either x ∼R yλz or x ≻R yλz. Assume 90
x ∼R yλz. It follows from x ≻R y and hemi-transitivity of ≿R 91
that yλz ≻R y. Moreover, it follows from the definition of weak 92
bi-preference and yλz ∼R x that yλz ∼S x. Then yλz ≻R y, 93
yλz ∼S x ≻S y and strong comonotonicity imply that yλz ≻S y. 94
Hence, λ ∈ I≻S (y, z, y). Now assume x ≻R yλz. Then the definition 95
of weak bi-preference implies that either x ≻S yλz or x ∼S yλz. 96
If x ≻S yλz, then λ ∈ I≺S (y, z, x). Then assume x ∼S yλz. Then 97
yλz ∼S x ≻R y imply that yλz ≿S y. Hence either yλz ≻S y or 98
yλz ∼S y. If yλz ∼S y, then x ≻S y ∼S yλz, x ≻R yλz and strong 99
comonotonicity imply that x ≻S yλz. This contradicts x ∼S yλz. 100
Hence, yλz ≻S y must hold. Therefore, λ ∈ I≻S (y, z, y). The proof 101
for yλz ≿R y is analogous. 102
Note that x ≻S y implies that 1 ∈ I≺S (y, z, x). Then it follows 103
from scalar bi-continuity of (≿R,≿S) that I≻S (y, z, y) ∪ I≺S (y, z, x) 104
is non-empty, open and closed subset of the connected set [0, 1]. 105
Then I≻S (y, z, y) ∪ I≺S (y, z, x) = [0, 1]. It follows from 0 ∈ 106
I≻S (y, z, y) ∪ I≺S (y, z, x) that z ≻S y or x ≻S z. Therefore, ≻S is 107
negatively transitive. 108
(b) Assume there exists u, v ∈ S such that u ▷◁S v. It follows from 109
non-triviality that x ≻S y for some x, y ∈ S. Then, part (a) implies 110
that x ≻S u or u ≻S y. Let x ≻S u. Then, part (a) implies that 111
x ≻S v or v ≻S u. Since u ▷◁S v, therefore x ≻S v. Hence, x ≻S u 112
and x ≻S v. Next, we show that 113
I≻S (x, u, v) ∩ I≻S (x, u, u) = I≿R (x, u, v) ∩ I≿R (x, u, u). 114
15 Note that Galaabaatar–Khan–Uyanık use both mixture-continuity and
Archimedean assumptions. As noted in Footnote 12, it is important for the
reader to realize that under the mixture-continuity assumption, Archimedean
property and part (ii) of scalar bi-continuity assumption are equivalent, hence
the generalization.
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One of the inclusion relationship directly follows from strong1
comonotonicity. In order to prove the other direction, pick λ ∈2
I≿R (x, u, v)∩ I≿R (x, u, u). Then xλu ≿R v, u. The definition of weak3
bi-preference implies that xλu ≿S v, u. Assume xλu ∼S v. Then it4
follows from the definition of weak bi-preference and xλu ≿R u5
that v ≿S u. This furnishes us a contradiction with u ▷◁S v. Hence,6
xλu ≻S v, i.e., λ ∈ I≻S (x, u, v). Now assume xλu ∼S u. Then7
an analogous argument implies that u ≿S v. This furnishes us a8
contradiction with u ▷◁S v. Hence, xλu ≻S v, i.e., λ ∈ I≻S (x, u, u).9
It follows from S1 and u ▷◁S v that 1 ∈ I≻S (x, u, v)∩ I≻S (x, u, u)10
and 0 /∈ I≻S (x, u, v) ∩ I≻S (x, u, u). Scalar bi-continuity of (≿R11
,≿S) implies I≿R (x, u, v) ∩ I≿R (x, u, u) is closed and I≻S (x, u, v) ∩12
I≻S (x, u, u) is open. Therefore, we obtain a non-empty proper13
subset of [0,1] which is both open and closed. This contradicts14
the connectedness of [0,1].15
The proof is analogous for u ≻S y. Therefore, ≿S is com-16
plete. □ □17
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